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Re: [Vulnerability Report] ctr-cnt: Host containers count info leak
by Akihiro Suda 25 Jan '24

25 Jan '24

I don't think this is a vuln. Containers have been leaking loadavg, memory usage, disk usage, and other resource counters too. 2024年1月25日(木) 18:09 'wanglei (M)' via OCI Security < security(a)opencontainers.org>: > Dear Container Security Teams: > > I hope this message finds you well. My name is LEI WANG, a container > security newb. I am writing to report a security vulnerability about host > containers count info leakage. > ------------------------------ > 1. Information > > *Item* > > *Details* > > *Note* > > Project > > docker <https://github.com/moby/moby> > > containerd <https://https/github.com/containerd/containerd> > > podman <https://github.com/containers/podman> > > > > crio > > > > runc <https://github.com/opencontainers/runc> > > Due to the widespread impact, we have also copied runc > > … > > If other container software is affected, please forward the email. > > Affect Version > > all > > CVSS > > 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N > > Author > > LEI WANG > > Github-ID: ssst0n3 <http://github.com/ssst0n3> > 2. Original Features > > Container runtimes manage the file system using graph drivers such as > overlay and devicemapper, which are loaded as modules into the kernel. > > The container runtime shares the host’s sysfs, where > /sys/module/<MODULE_NAME>/refcnt represents the reference count of the > corresponding module. The reference count of these modules typically > matches the number of mounted file systems on the host, thereby leaking the > number of running containers on the host. > 3. Vulnerability > 3.1 Description > > Files such as /sys/module/overlay/refcnt reveal the number of containers > running on the host because the sysfs of the host is shared when the > container is running. > 3.2 Impact > > All versions of the all runtime are affected > > - docker > - containerd > - cri-o > - podman > - … > > Given the breadth of the impact on the runtime, it may be necessary to > copy runc. > > Disclosure of the number of containers running on a host can provide > several potential advantages to an attacker: > > 1. *Target value assessment*: If an attacker knows that a system is > running a large number of containers, the system may host multiple services > or applications, indicating that the target is a high-value target. > > 2. *Resource utilization and load information*: The number of > containers can give attackers some clues about system resource utilization > and load. For example, a host running a large number of containers may have > high resource usage, which may allow attackers to use this information to > launch denial-of-service (DoS) or distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) > attacks. > > 3. *Attack vector identification*: Knowing the number of containers > may also help attackers infer potential attack vectors. For example, if > many containers are running, attackers may assume that some of these > containers may not have proper security configuration or timely software > updates. > > 4. *Penetration policy planning*: Attackers may plan multi-phase > attacks or select the most likely unhardened container intrusion based on > the number of containers and their speculation about the system > architecture. > 3.3 CVSS > > 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N > <https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/…> > > *vector* > > *score* > > *reason* > > Attack Vector > > Local > > Attack Complexity > > Low > > Privileges Required > > None > > User Interaction > > None > > Scope > > Changed > > Confidentiality > > Low > > Integrity > > None > > Availability > > None > 4. PoC > > $ docker ps |wc -l > > 7 > > $ docker run -ti ubuntu cat /sys/module/overlay/refcnt > > 7 > > $ docker run -tid ubuntu bash > > 78f902370c4bc18b787b95bca5079c052b8b7acd3e43cb7ccff01d8c4c740094 > > $ docker run -ti ubuntu cat /sys/module/overlay/refcnt > > 8 > > 5. Fixing Suggestion > > Add refcnt to maskedpath by referring to the method of setting maskedpath > in Docker. > > https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/25.0/oci/defaults.go#L105-L116 > > MaskedPaths: []string{ > > "/proc/asound", > > "/proc/acpi", > > "/proc/kcore", > > "/proc/keys", > > "/proc/latency_stats", > > "/proc/timer_list", > > "/proc/timer_stats", > > "/proc/sched_debug", > > "/proc/scsi", > > "/sys/firmware", > > "/sys/devices/virtual/powercap", > > }, > > 6. Others > > Should this issue be confirmed as a vulnerability, I kindly request > assistance in obtaining a CVE-ID. I would appreciate it if the credit for > this discovery could be assigned to my GitHub ID: ssst0n3. If you require > any further assistance, please feel free to contact me at your convenience. > ------------------------------ > > Thank you for your time and attention to this matter. We look forward to > your response and guidance on the next steps. > > Best regards, > > LEI WANG > > > > -- > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to security+unsubscribe(a)opencontainers.org. >

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Podman Community Meeting Tuesday February 6, 2024, 11:00 am EST (UTC-5)
by Tom Sweeney 23 Jan '24

23 Jan '24

Hey All! The next Podman Community Meeting is happening two weeks from today. Tuesday February 6, 2024, 11:00am EST (UTC-5). We have one probable topic now and would love to have one or two more! Agenda with conference link: https://hackmd.io/fc1zraYdS0-klJ2KJcfC7w?both Hope to see you there! t

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Podman v4.9.0 Released
by Ashley Cui 23 Jan '24

23 Jan '24

We’re excited to announce that Podman v4.9.0 has been released! Here's what's new: Features - The podman farm suite of commands for multi-architecture builds is now fully enabled and documented. - Add a network recovery service to Podman Machine VMs using the QEMU backend to detect and recover from an inoperable host networking issues experienced by Mac users when running for long periods of time. Bugfixes - Fixed a bug where the HyperV provider for podman machine did not forward the API socket to the host machine. - Fixed a bug where improperly formatted annotations passed to podman kube play could cause Podman to panic. - Fixed a bug where podman system reset could fail if non-Podman containers (e.g. containers created by Buildah) were present. Misc - Containers run in podman machine VMs now default to a PID limit of unlimited, instead of 2048. Try it out and let us know what you think! -- Ashley Cui

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scp'ing a podman image to another host
by Matthias Apitz 19 Jan '24

19 Jan '24

I have an image on RH 8.x which runs fine (containing a SuSE SLES and PostgreSQL server): $ podman images REPOSITORY TAG IMAGE ID CREATED SIZE localhost/suse latest c87c80c0911a 26 hours ago 6.31 GB registry.suse.com/bci/bci-base 15.4 5bd0e4152d92 2 weeks ago 123 MB I created a connection to another host as: $ podman system connection list Name URI Identity Default srap57 ssh://apitzm@srap57dxr1.dev.xxxxxx.org:22/run/user/200007/podman/podman.sock true To the other host I can SSH fine based on RSA public/private keys and podman is installed there to: $ ssh apitzm(a)srap57dxr1.dev.xxxxxx.org Last login: Wed Jan 10 14:05:12 2024 from 10.201.64.28 apitzm@srap57dxr1:~> podman version Client: Podman Engine Version: 4.7.2 API Version: 4.7.2 Go Version: go1.21.4 Built: Wed Nov 1 13:00:00 2023 When I now copy over the image with: $ podman image scp c87c80c0911a srap57:: it transfers the ~6 GByte (I can see them in /tmp as a big tar file of tar files) and at the end it says: ... Writing manifest to image destination $ (i.e. the shell prompt is there again) But on srap57dxr1.dev.xxxxxx.org I can't see anything of the image at the end. What I've done wrong? Thanks matthias -- Matthias Apitz, ✉ guru(a)unixarea.de, http://www.unixarea.de/ +49-176-38902045 Public GnuPG key: http://www.unixarea.de/key.pub I am not at war with Russia. Я не воюю с Россией. Ich bin nicht im Krieg mit Russland.

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Running x86_64-based containers on Mac computers with an Apple silicon (M1) processor
by Matthias Apitz 18 Jan '24

18 Jan '24

Hello, For the purpose of the Subject: there is a tutorial at IBM.com: https://developer.ibm.com/tutorials/running-x86-64-containers-mac-silicon-m… I've followed this tutorial, with a small exception, see below. The first step is to 'init' the machine with: $ podman machine init --image-path ~/yourFedoraImageFolder/fedora-coreos-39.20231204.3.3-qemu.x86_64.qcow2.xz intel Extracting compressed file: intel_fedora-coreos-39.20231204.3.3-qemu.x86_64.qco… Image resized. Machine init complete To start your machine run: podman machine start intel Which worked fine. Now, before starting the machine, the tutorial asks to remove the following lines from the config file ~/.config/containers/podman/machine/qemu/intel.json: "-machine", "q35,accel=hvf:tcg", "-cpu", "host", These line are not there 1:1 and I removed these lines: $ diff .config/containers/podman/machine/qemu/intel.json .config/containers/podman/machine/qemu/intel.json.saved2 6a7,12 > "-accel", > "hvf", > "-accel", > "tcg", > "-cpu", > "host", which seems to me correct to remove the HVF QEMU accelerator which only is supported on x86 chips. Starting the machine now with: $ podman machine start intel Di 16 Jan 2024 12:23:33 CET Starting machine "intel" Waiting for VM ... hangs for ever and the QEMU process has 100% CPU utilization: top PID COMMAND %CPU TIME #TH #WQ #PORT MEM PURG CMPRS PGRP 10802 qemu-system- 99.6 23:09.43 8/1 0 27 163M 0B 0B 10800 Any ideas? Thanks matthias -- Matthias Apitz, ✉ guru(a)unixarea.de, http://www.unixarea.de/ +49-176-38902045 Public GnuPG key: http://www.unixarea.de/key.pub I am not at war with Russia. Я не воюю с Россией. Ich bin nicht im Krieg mit Russland.

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processes running in a podman container are visible on the host
by Matthias Apitz 17 Jan '24

17 Jan '24

I've built an own podman image which boots a SuSE Linux, starts a PostgreSQL dataserver and a SSH daemon to login into. The end of the Dockerfile says: ... # Start PostgreSQL server and SSH daemon on container start # COPY initSunRise.sh /usr/local/bin/initSunRise.sh RUN chmod 0755 /usr/local/bin/initSunRise.sh RUN mkdir /home/sisis/dump ; chown sisis:sisis /home/sisis/dump COPY testdb.dmp.gz /home/sisis/dump RUN chown sisis:sisis /home/sisis/dump/testdb.dmp.gz RUN echo "/etc/init.d/postgres start" >> /usr/local/bin/start.sh RUN echo "/usr/local/bin/initSunRise.sh" >> /usr/local/bin/start.sh RUN echo "/usr/sbin/sshd -D" >> /usr/local/bin/start.sh RUN chmod 0755 /usr/local/bin/start.sh EXPOSE 22 8076 3045 ENTRYPOINT /usr/local/bin/start.sh Before it starts the SSH daemon it fires up a shellscript /usr/local/bin/initSunRise.sh which should fill the PostgreSQL server with a database. When I now start the image on the server (also a SuSE SLES) with podman run -p 2022:22 -t suse Starting PostgreSQL: ok nohup: appending output to 'nohup.out' I can SSH into the system on port 2022 and see: ssh -p 2022 root@srap57dxr1 root(a)srap57dxr1.dev.oclc.org's password: Last login: Fri Jan 12 08:35:16 2024 from 10.0.2.100 3856d0d6b62d:~ # 3856d0d6b62d:~ # ps ax PID TTY STAT TIME COMMAND 1 pts/0 Ss+ 0:00 /bin/sh -c /usr/local/bin/start.sh 30 ? S 0:00 /usr/local/sisis-pap/pgsql-15.1/bin/postmaster -D /da 33 ? Ss 0:00 postgres: logger 34 ? Ss 0:00 postgres: checkpointer 35 ? Ss 0:00 postgres: background writer 37 ? Ss 0:01 postgres: walwriter 38 ? Ss 0:00 postgres: autovacuum launcher 39 ? Ss 0:00 postgres: logical replication launcher 45 pts/0 S+ 0:00 sh -c gzip -dc /home/sisis/dump/testdb.dmp.gz | /usr/ 46 pts/0 S+ 0:00 sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd -D [listener] 0 of 10-100 startu 47 pts/0 S+ 0:09 gzip -dc /home/sisis/dump/testdb.dmp.gz 48 pts/0 S+ 0:04 /usr/local/sisis-pap/pgsql/bin/psql -Usisis sisis 49 ? Rs 1:28 postgres: sisis sisis [local] COPY 51 ? Rs 0:08 postgres: autovacuum worker sisis 52 ? Rs 0:00 sshd: root@pts/1 54 pts/1 Ss 0:00 -bash This looks all fine 47 is the process which decompresses the dump and pipes it to the proc 48 which is a SQL process loading the data into the PostgreSQL server. This looks all fine to me and works as expected. But, when I now to a 'ps ax' on the host server where the 'podman run ...' runs, I see the same proceses with other PID as they would run on the host and not in the container: 6322 pts/0 Sl+ 0:00 podman run -p 2022:22 -t suse 6337 pts/0 S 0:00 /usr/bin/slirp4netns --disable-host-loopback --mtu=65520 --enable-sandbox --enable-seccomp --enable-ipv6 -c -r 3 -e 4 --netns-type=path /data/guru/containers/tmp/netns/netns-23da4d70-34da-9034-917b-1e56362a5bbb tap0 6344 pts/0 Sl 0:00 rootlessport 6354 pts/0 Sl 0:00 rootlessport-child 6363 ? Ss 0:00 /usr/bin/conmon --api-version 1 -c 3856d0d6b62d01b46c17c160937ea6e9b8239ec64ce2c8e3ce3b4648652b47dc -u 3856d0d6b62d01b46c17c160937ea6e9b8239ec64ce2c8e3ce3b4648652b47dc -r /usr/bin/runc -b /home/apitzm/.local/share/containers/storage/overlay-containers/3856d0d6b62d01b46c17c160937ea6e9b8239ec64ce2c8e3ce3b4648652b47dc/userdata -p /home/apitzm/.local/share/containers/tmp/overlay-containers/3856d0d6b62d01b46c17c160937ea6e9b8239ec64ce2c8e3ce3b4648652b47dc/userdata/pidfile -n great_bouman --exit-dir /run/user/200007/libpod/tmp/exits --full-attach -l journald --log-level warning --syslog..... ... 6428 pts/0 S+ 0:00 sh -c gzip -dc /home/sisis/dump/testdb.dmp.gz | /usr/local/sisis-pap/pgsql/bin/psql -Usisis sisis >> /home/sisis/err 2>&1 ; /usr/local/sisis-pap/pgsql/bin/psql -Usisis sisis < ~sisis/sc/PosUpdSeq.sql >> /home/sisis/err 2>&1 6429 pts/0 S+ 0:00 sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd -D [listener] 0 of 10-100 startups 6430 pts/0 S+ 0:17 gzip -dc /home/sisis/dump/testdb.dmp.gz 6431 pts/0 S+ 0:06 /usr/local/sisis-pap/pgsql/bin/psql -Usisis sisis 6432 ? Rs 2:09 postgres: sisis sisis [local] COPY See the gzip proc 6430 and the SQL proc 6431. Is this correct so by intention that the processes which run in a container are visible from outside? Forgive me a maybe stupid question, I'm doing UNIX for 35 years and podman for 35 days :-) Thanks matthias -- Matthias Apitz, ✉ guru(a)unixarea.de, http://www.unixarea.de/ +49-176-38902045 Public GnuPG key: http://www.unixarea.de/key.pub I am not at war with Russia. Я не воюю с Россией. Ich bin nicht im Krieg mit Russland.

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can podman rootless support qemu-user-static for other arch?
by Larry Cai 16 Jan '24

16 Jan '24

Hi: I have a use case to run an ARM based container inside podman on an x86 platform. see https://github.com/multiarch/qemu-user-static It works for me using rootful podman env ``` [root@podman-priv /]# podman run --rm --privileged multiarch/qemu-user-static --reset -p yes[root@podman-priv /]# podman run --rm -t arm32v6/alpine uname -marmv7l[root@podman-priv /]# podman run --rm -t arm64v8/fedora uname -maarch64 ``` but when I try this in rootless environment (i am not good at technical detail in low level) ``` $ podman run --rm --privileged docker.io/multiarch/qemu-user-static --reset -p yes mount: permission denied (are you root?) mount: permission denied (are you root?) ``` so my questions: 1. is it possible to enable this for rootless env? if not, can I use sudo command to run it once 2. is it done in system level or needs to be done for each user if it is the common env Rgs, larry

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Is Network=host actually insecure with rootless Podman?
by jklaiho＠iki.fi 10 Jan '24

10 Jan '24

I've run into highly mysterious and randomly occurring issues with both container-to-host and container-to-LAN PostgreSQL connections. It makes me suspect something is awry with either Podman or Pasta networking, because running the same service (a Django gunicorn process) bare metal under Supervisor using host-to-host or host-to-LAN PostgreSQL connections doesn't exhibit this issue. This post is not about that, though. To isolate what part of the system is causing the issue, I need to set up a separate test server where I'll try moving away from Pasta networking into host networking instead to verify that everything still works, and if it does, move our servers facing the connection issues to use host networking. I've read Erik Sjölund's excellent writeup at https://github.com/eriksjolund/podman-networking-docs and the Medium post it linked to claiming that host networking is insecure, at https://medium.com/nttlabs/dont-use-host-network-namespace-f548aeeef575. It deals with Docker and rootful containers, so immediately I'm thinking that the applicability to rootless Podman is limited or nonexistent. We use iptables and only expose SSH and nginx to the outside world. Any applications we run in Pasta-networked rootless containers get reverse proxied with nginx. We only run the actual applications in containers; things like PostgreSQL, nginx and Redis are all host services. Pasta has been a boon to us by conveniently exposing ports bidirectionally between container and host and preserving request IPs. The basic question is: is host networking in rootless Podman any less secure than just running the same services uncontainerized, directly on the host OS, as a non-root user? Even if we exposed a rootless containerized service port directly to the outside world without reverse proxying, I don't see how this would be any riskier with host networking than it would be with bare metal. If the risk profile is the same or very nearly the same as that, I consider that sufficient.

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Podman Community Cabal meeting Tues Jan 16, 2024, 11:00 am EST (UTC-5)
by Tom Sweeney 09 Jan '24

09 Jan '24

The first Podman Community Cabal meeting of 2024 will start one week from now! We will meet on Tuesday, Jan 16, 2024, at 11:00am EST (UTC-5). Current talks on krun, crun on qemu, and image signing, and maybe more! Agenda with conference link: https://hackmd.io/gQCfskDuRLm7iOsWgH2yrg?both Hope to see you there! t

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Announcement: Podman Security Fix Release: v4.8.3
by Lokesh Mandvekar 03 Jan '24

03 Jan '24

Podman v4.8.3 is now out with a security fix for CVE-2023-48795: Terrapin, a prefix truncation attack targeting the SSH protocol. CVE-2023-48795 details can be found at: [1] Mitre: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-48795 [2] GitHub Security Advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-45x7-px36-x8w8 Checkout the v4.8.3 release page for release notes and artifacts: https://github.com/containers/podman/releases/tag/v4.8.3 -- Lokesh Libera, GitLab, GitHub, Fedora: lsm5 Matrix: @lsm5:matrix.org GPG: 9E33DD8704CC03E2DEB84D9A1C1EDD7CC7C3A0DD https://keybase.io/lsm5

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